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Abstract 
This work aims at providing a framework to help analyse governance in networks of cooperative firms. It 
builds on four bodies of literature: cooperation, transaction costs, monopoly capitalism, production 
networks. It considers four variables from transaction cost theory, which we use to interpret the governance 
of cooperative firms and their networks. These are: (1) values, (2) property rights, (3) control, (4) resource 
allocation. We associate the specific principles that define the identity of cooperative organisations (self-
help, members’ ownership, democratic control, financial participation, limited capital remuneration) 
alongside these dimensions. We then apply the same dimensions to production networks and propose a 
stylised networking model for cooperatives and identify two polarised types of networks: (1) heterarchical 
forms of coordination based on cooperation and mutual help, (2) hierarchical coordination based on 
exclusive direction.  
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[W]e are still very ignorant about institutions” 
Williamson, 2000: 595 
 
1. Introduction 
There are 4.7 million people employed by cooperatives in Europe (Roelants, Dovgan, Eum & Terrasi, 2012). 
Cooperation is a prominent phenomenon in France, Italy, Spain and it is growing in the UK, where medium 
to small cooperatives represent an important part of the economy. The cooperative basic idea is centred on 
the specific aim of membership welfare to be reached by means of democratic governance. Albeit much has 
been written on the dispositions, practices and outcomes affecting economic sustainability, member welfare 
and - through this - community welfare, scholarly conversations on the impact of cooperative strategies on 
other stakeholders (besides members) need to be developed further (Sacchetti, 2013). Think in particular 
about production relationships. One of the most striking characteristics of the way today firms organise their 
production is in the richness of connections with other firms/organisations. The flourishing of an increasing 
number and variety of linkages has developed in parallel with globalisation, the progressive intensification of 
inter-firm relations across regions and countries. It became, therefore, very topical during the 1990s to be 
concerned with networking amongst firms whether, for instance, focusing on strategic alliances, or whether 
emphasising the relative strength and weaknesses of organising activities inside the firm or through inter-
firm relationships. 
This paper has been written with the specific aim of clarifying how cooperatives engage in production 
relations with other firms. An assessment of inter-firm relations, in our view, cannot isolate from the value-
based nature of cooperatives. Our reasoning proceeds as follows. Cooperatives are embedded in a set of 
explicit values and principles which define their governance structure. Governance rules define who decides 
about what to produce, where and how. Production organisation has therefore important distributional 
implications, since by dividing labour it also distributes learning, innovation and surplus opportunities across 
the organisation and other firms (Kaplinsky, 2000). Whilst, however, cooperatives are explicit on internal 
governance rules, there is no explicit reference to the way they relate with other production stakeholders, 
how surplus and other opportunities are distributed and to what ends.  
The vast literature on production democracy does not address inter-firm relations, albeit they constitute the 
essence of production organisation or of the way control over distributional issues is allocated. On the other 
hand value-chain literature has always focused on inter-firm division of labour amongst conventional for-
profit firms (Cf. Kanter, 1989; Kaplinsky, 2000; Jarillo, 1988; Porter, 1990; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). 
Assessing production networks by cooperative firms requires therefore bridging these two streams of work. 
To this aim, we first need to disentangle democratic values and principles looking beyond the micro-level of 
internal incentives and employment, and even beyond the internal governance structure. The entire point of 
engaging in this effort is that if we challenge the values of cooperation at a fundamental ontological level, 
we can possibly understand whether these organisations may have a consistent and lasting grip on 
production governance beyond their legal borders. 
To illustrate, consider the recent debate about worker cooperatives in times of crisis. The European 
Confederation of Worker Cooperatives, Social Cooperatives and Social and Participative Enterprises (CECOP) 
highlights subcontracting as an alternative or complementary solution (amongst others) to the use of 
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cooperative reserves (CECOP, 2012). A perspective on inter-firm relations would suggest a more careful 
approach, as the stability of employment in worker cooperatives needs to be weighed against the 
implications of its external strategies, controlling in particular for the distribution of the positive and 
negative effects on for-profit subcontractors and subsidiaries. 
Our double concern with values and with who controls production decisions reasserts that we are not 
addressing relationships amongst neutral agents. Rather we speak of the basic cell of production, the firm, 
its fundamental values, and the power that it can exert over other actors, such as employees, clients and 
other firms, although our analysis concentrates on the latter. Through this approach we substantially 
understand inter-firm relationships in terms of networks of forces (Sacchetti and Sugden, 2003). The general 
idea is to reach beyond the internal organisation of production and its democratic principles to understand 
how inter-firm coordination structures can impact on the welfare of connected actors, beside members. The 
relevance of our perspective is in the impacts that inter-firm relations involving cooperatives can have on the 
welfare of a multiplicity of organisations and the communities where these are located. This problem 
assumes particular relevance in the context of cooperative identity, which explicitly recognises cooperative 
autonomy, cooperation among cooperatives and community welfare as part of its constituent principles 
(ICA, 1995).  
In order to concentrate on external production governance and its impacts we will assume that, internally, 
the cooperative is equipped with deliberative democracy processes that ensure a shared understanding of 
cooperative values and aims
i
 and that internal governance and practices reflect the essential economic 
objective of promoting the welfare of members. Albeit this is a simplification of an evolving complex reality, 
it allows us to concentrate on the coherence of external governance with respect to the principles of 
cooperation.  
The paper proceeds as follows. We first consider four dimensions from transaction cost theory, which we 
use to interpret a layered model of cooperative governance and networks linkages thereof. These are: (1) 
values, (2) property rights, (3) control structure, (4) resource allocation. We interpret the values and 
principles that define the identity of cooperative organisations alongside these dimensions. We then apply 
the same dimensions to production networks and propose a stylised, value-based network model for 
cooperatives. Against this normative conceptualisation we consider inter-firm relations in practice injecting 
power in our analysis. Depending on its distribution across networked firms, we identify two polarised types 
of networks: (1) heterarchical forms of coordination based on cooperation and mutual help, (2) hierarchical 
coordination based on exclusive direction. For each network type the paper presents illustrations focusing 
on specific institutions and regional experiences. We compare both types with our stylised, normative 
framework. The last Section offers a concluding summary and recommendations.  
 
2. The value-laden nature of cooperatives 
New-institutionalism provides an explanation on why firms emerge and why they develop by “economising” 
on governance costs (Williamson, 1990). The governance institutions of the firm aim at minimising conflict, 
hazard and uncertainty over behaviours and outcomes. In a later contribution, Williamson (2000) positions 
new-institutionalism into a layered framework which grounds a) property rights, b) governance structures 
and c) economic incentives into informal socioeconomic institutions, e.g. habits, traditions, values, norms.  
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What Williamson seems to suggest with his framework is that formal institutions can be grounded on a 
variety of informal social institutions as long as they economise. This multi-layered approach is particularly 
relevant in our case, since cooperatives are defined by norms that reflect values such as “self-help, self-
responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, solidarity, justice, mutual help” as well as “social responsibility 
and caring for others” (ICA, 1995). These values are implemented through the seven ICA principles: voluntary 
and open membership, democratic member control, members’ economic participation, autonomy and 
independence, education training and information, cooperation among cooperatives, concern for 
community. These are not, as a norm, emphasised within conventional business communities. Rather, they 
represent the niche culture,
ii
 not typically rewarded in the market place.  
Because compared with conventional firms’ values and aims, the economic efficiency principle is erroneously 
presented as a constraint that cooperative governance needs to meet,
 iii
 whilst overall the nature and 
objectives of cooperatives would be best understood as fulfilment of the ICA seven principles (Cf. Novkovic, 
Prokopowicz & Stocki, 2012). Rather, we would say that given the values, aims and principles that lead 
cooperative economic activity, the governance structure of cooperative firms is in fact economising. We can 
appreciate this observation by systematically interpreting the values and principles of cooperation in 
conjunction with the formal institutions of cooperation. We use Williamson’s layered framework and 
position values at the basis of all subsequent institutional formalisations (Level 1, Figure 1).  
Figure 1 (bottom) 
Ownership rights and governance structures work as constraining and enabling institutional mechanisms 
aimed at economic sustainability on the one hand, whilst pursuing fulfilment of basic cooperatives values on 
the other (Cf. Commons, 1934). At Level 2 we place those principles regarding the nature of property rights. 
In particular, the designation of who owns and control resources responds to principles of voluntary and 
open membership, joint ownership of members, and members’ economic participation. The general aim is to 
increase members’ welfare through self-help, self-responsibility, and mutuality. The definition of property 
rights in cooperatives has been brought to the fore by Hansman’s work. A strong interpretation of his 
argument (as in Borzaga and Tortia, 2010) is that cooperatives can be seen as substitutes of investor-owned 
organizations when the market fails, especially in the presence of asymmetric distribution of market power 
ex-ante (monopoly and monopsony power) and ex-post (contractual failures and lock-in into contractual 
relations). Failures are usually found when markets are either not competitive enough, or are not properly 
regulated (Hansmann, 1988, 1996, 2013). On the other hand, when established, cooperatives have been able 
to achieve sustainability and resilience since they are reported to last significantly longer than investor-
owned firms (Burdín, 2013). In this interpretation, the relatively small number of cooperatives is not due to 
their inability to withstand market competition, but to a lower rate of creation, which can be explained if we 
acknowledge that cooperatives have an explicit value-laden nature and that such values are not dominant in 
current economic systems. Also, the weak interest of external investors in financing cooperatives
iv
 (regarding 
mainly loans or to the purchase of cooperative bonds) places the obligation to fulfil economic, financial, and 
organisational requirements directly on the self-organised membership. 
This brings us to the third Level, where principles define how control over the use of resources has to be 
implemented. Within the cooperative model, the principles of democratic member control and participation 
in the allocation of surplus define the internal governance structure. The purpose of these instruments, 
specifically, is to achieve procedural fairness, as per the values of democracy, equality and equity (Tyler & 
Blader, 2000; Tortia, 2008).The governance structure represents an effort to construct a democratic order, 
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thereby eliminating conflict (between investors and other major patrons) and distributing decision-making 
power. However structural choices do not seem to be sufficient for mitigating ex-post conflict. Evidence of 
the difficulties of implementing democratic governance is subsumed by the three dimensions identified by 
Cornforth, Thomas, Lewis and Spear (1988). These are:  a) “constitutional degeneration,” which occurs when 
decision-making power shifts from the members to a restricted group and turns into the exercise of power 
by an elite; b) “capitalist degeneration,” when cooperatives adopt financial instruments and practices that 
are typical of investor-controlled firms; c) “internal pressures” when misbehaviour and opportunism increase 
managerial control at the expenses of democratic and deliberative processes (Cf. Varman and Chakrabarti, 
2004). 
This last point takes us to Level 4, where incentives are aligned with the governance structure so as to match 
individual behaviours with firm’s objectives. In cooperatives, the rules underpinning the actual allocation of 
resources are defined by an internal incentive system which emphasises limited remuneration of capital as 
well as the reinvestment of residual income for mutualistic and communitarian purposes. These instruments 
are particularly oriented towards the pursuit of distributive fairness, long-term sustainability and the 
creation of societal value. 
 
2.1. Heterarchical integration of stakeholders 
The multi-stakeholder cooperative is a particular case of Level 2 and 3 institutions. Multi-stakeholder 
governance is the specific organisational solution designed to internalise the complexity of multiple 
stakeholders’ objectives (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2014). This solution is common when the aims of cooperatives 
are public, for example in the provision of social services. Through multi-stakeholdership the allocation of 
strategic control is shared amongst a multiplicity of patrons, who have voice also in decisions about the 
allocation of surplus. The identification of stakeholders and the allocation of strategic decision-making 
power is – as Bacchiega and Borzaga (2001) observe – “a consequence of the type of redistributional needs 
and market failures that characterise the production of a specific good or service.”  
The internalisation of the network of stakeholders and their multiple interdependent interests increases 
complexity and requires, at Level 2, that stakeholders craft property rights and distributional rules that 
ensure mutuality, equality and democratic control. Deliberative praxis at Level 3 and incentive systems at 
Level 4 need to be shaped to include multiple perspectives, reduce potential conflicts and reach agreement 
in the long-run interests of all partners. Multi-stakeholdership is therefore meant to reduce the production 
of negative externalities whilst producing positive externalities for society. This shows a high consistency 
with the cooperative principles promoting self-help, self-responsibility and mutuality, equity and the 
production of societal value (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2014). 
 
3. The cooperative governance of production linkages 
Similarly to what has been argued about traditional for-profit firms, cooperatives do not work in isolation. 
Extending Coase’s warning cooperatives cannot be considered as “islands of economic planning” (Coase, 
1937). Rather, they are businesses which operate in the market, interacting with its extent, structure and 
technologies, whilst being placed in a context often dominated by investor-owned firms, their for-profit 
nature and related incentives . Both large corporations and smaller firms rely for their activities upon a mesh 
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of linkages and relations with other firms, which can be based in different localities. The theme of the 
division of labour amongst firms is not new, and Marshall (1921) already emphasised how production on a 
large scale could be undertaken by the co-ordination of activities of small production units. Not only can the 
scale of activities be augmented through networking. Through linkages, firms may benefit of a multiplicity of 
competencies and sources of experience that enlarge the scope of their production. Remarkably, one of the 
reasons which pushes firms to build external linkages is the need to find the synergies to solve specific 
production problems. 
By virtue of their linkages, firms commit to various degrees to other external actors. Such commitment may 
be reciprocal and may represent a source of opportunities for the firm, or it can become the thread through 
which the firm that retains greater economic power directs the other. Take, for instance, the case of 
subcontracting relations. They might imply professional subordination and economic dependence of the 
subcontractor, conferring to quasi-vertical organisations a strong hierarchical character. Pyramidal 
structures of subcontracting relations, for instance, have been produced out of evidence from the 
automobile industry (Semlinger, 1993; Helper, 1993). Typically through contractual agreements, the large 
corporation exercises its control over other firms without having to internalise their activities (Cowling and 
Sugden, 1994). The result could be “strategic failure” (Cowling and Sugden, 1998): concentration of strategic 
decision-making power in the hands of a few might imply that production governance fails to effectively 
pursue the interests of the network of firms at large.  
Being businesses with explicit values, cooperatives can have a purpose for building their networks differently 
from what described above. Cooperative networks can work as enablers and amplifiers of the values of 
cooperation, thus generating positive effects across societies at large. The idea being that networks that 
reproduce, in their praxis and outcomes, the values of cooperation can help in achieving a “critical mass” of 
cooperative attitudes, which would otherwise run the risk of being displaced by the prevailing values 
underpinning conventional economic aims and processes (Witt, 2003).  
However, networking may not be synonymous with cooperation not even in the case of cooperative firms. 
Since the focus of cooperative principles is on internal membership, cooperatives construct formal and 
relational networks interpreting their values in different ways. Specifically, relations are formed in the 
market context, where performance is conventionally measured by pecuniary achievement (Veblen 
1899/2003). The pervasiveness of the profit motivation and related practices, namely in terms of control 
allocation and distributional effects, becomes of concern when conventional business aims are placed before 
cooperative aims (Weisbrod, 1998).  
These concerns offer a fertile terrain for an analysis that discriminates amongst the different modalities used 
by cooperatives to govern inter-firm relations. 
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3.1.  A normative framework for networks 
We associate the specific principles that define the identity of cooperative organisations alongside formal 
inter-firm network institutions, and propose a stylised networking model for cooperatives.  
Figure 2 (bottom) 
What would the institutions of a cooperative network be, if we accepted the validity of cooperative values 
and principles in defining inter-firm relations? From a normative perspective, the definition of formal 
network institutions may be exemplified by second level cooperatives, for example consortia or cooperative 
groups, which take the form of cooperatives of cooperatives (Level 2). This form of collaboration would be 
consistent with joint member ownership at Level 2 and democratic member control at Level 3 in our 
framework. Likewise other contracts (e.g. financial participation, partnerships, subcontracting) should be 
drafted so that the governance structure of the network is heterarchical, participatory and democratic. At 
Level 4 the allocation of surplus should follow similar rules to those of first level cooperatives. In the case of 
second level cooperatives distribution of material and immaterial surplus is defined through participatory 
and non-exclusive mechanisms, which take into account the objectives and the needs of all involved 
constituencies. Likewise, incentives should be drafted to achieve mutual benefit with no parties exploiting 
their competitive advantages against others’ interests. For example, strategic decisions about division of 
labour or the possibility to upgrade knowledge and technology would aim at avoiding the concentration of 
rent opportunities across the network (Cf. Kaplinsky, 2000). The fairness of distributional outcomes would be 
a direct result of the democratic control at Level 3. 
 
3.2. Network praxis and monopoly capitalism 
Against the stylised normative idea of inter-firm coordination illustrated above, network praxis entails diverse 
approaches to formal and substantive control allocation, to membership, common resources, and their 
management.   
Much has been written on networking of capitalist enterprises. The analysis of conventional corporations has 
emphasised that markets are not in general competitive and that control without ownership can be observed 
also between firms, not only internally as theorised by agency theory (Cowling, 1982; Cowling and Sugden, 
1987). Under monopoly capitalism conventional firms would aim at maximising profits not only by pursuing 
monopoly power on the end-product market but also along the value chain by moving production activities 
across countries and by subcontracting production phases to dependent firms (ibid.).  
Cowling and Sugden (ibid.), therefore, conceive the firm in terms of its strategic influence over other actors, 
such as governments, labour, clients, subcontractors. The firm, therefore, may be defined as the strategic 
planner and controller of an international network of production, which includes all those actors on which 
the strategic decision-making of the firm has a substantial influence.  
We would argue that if cooperatives mimic the strategy of conventional firms under monopoly capitalism 
and pursue exclusive direction over production linkages, not only network governance will not be 
economizing, but the cooperative will dilute its identity and fail to produce the positive externalities of 
cooperation.  
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Building on monopoly capitalism literature, we focus on the distribution of control power and rent across the 
network and operate a fundamental differentiation amongst cooperative firms. For each of its external 
linkages a cooperative firm can be considered as: 
(a) An inter-actor, or an active participant which relates with another firm on a mutual and reciprocal basis. 
This relational form conforms with the cooperative ideal described in Figure 2, as it emphasises heterarchical 
relations based on deliberation, reciprocity, and mutual dependence in strategic decision-making, such as on 
the allocation of control and rent distribution (Sacchetti & Sugden 2003, 2009).  
(b) The recipient of another organisation’s strategic choices, or an organisation which is mostly subject to 
production decisions taken elsewhere and which impact on what is produced and how, what it is learned 
and rent distribution. Here the recipient firm assumes a passive role and control is de facto external to the 
firm.  
(c) A director. The cooperative is an external source of control and direction for another firm. Reflecting 
monopoly capitalism critiques, the active role of the director carries the potential of being exerted at the 
expenses of the recipient, who is excluded from strategic decisions of interest. The alienation of control 
rights impacts also on other strategic decisions, such as the production of a residual income and its 
allocation. The director-recipient relation would not be consistent with the general principles of mutual-
help, autonomy and independence of cooperatives since it would  detach some of the cooperative principles 
from actual strategic behaviour. 
We use the heterarchical/hierarchical criterion to increase our understanding of the nature and implications 
of specific solutions, such as non-profit consortia, the network contract, public-private partnerships, social 
capital networks, financial linkages, subcontracting, and market relations through and by relating this to 
cooperative principles.  
Figure 3 about here 
 
4. Heterarchical coordination via external linkages 
We talk of heterarchical coordination when strategic production decisions are not exclusively taken from 
one major centre and then enforced on others, but self-managed with the aim of recognising reciprocal 
interests and mutual dependence around shared common activities. Across the heterarchical network, 
cooperatives keep their autonomy whilst identifying common activities around which labour is coordinated 
by means of shared common rules. The norms applied throughout the network define also how the benefits 
of shared activities are distributed. In heterarchical networks these norms are designed to increase the 
opportunities of each and every network member.  
 
4.1. Non-profit consortia of small and medium cooperatives (SMCs) 
Small and medium size cooperatives (SMCs) are likely to be subject to dependence on their main 
contractors, whether those are conventional firms, larger cooperatives or public administrations. Consider 
for example the provision of social services, where social cooperatives currently play a large role (in Italy and 
in various other countries).
 
Typically the public sector would work as the main contractor of local social 
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cooperatives. In this case we can talk of public-sector-anchored cooperatives whose objectives, methods and 
sustainability are mostly influenced by the welfare policy and standards set alongside public administrators’ 
decision to externalise public services. 
In the case of public-sector-anchored cooperatives, consistency –  and in particular the principle of 
cooperative autonomy and independence – needs to be tested in practice, as dependence on the public 
sector is generally high and can expose the cooperative to the dangers of public failure. Consider, for 
example, inefficiencies in public administrations causing delays that make social cooperatives insolvent, 
eventually bankrupt, and service beneficiaries uncovered. Consider also the tendency of the public sector to 
prefer the delivery of standardized and easily controllable services, to the experimentation of innovative, but 
more effective and creative solutions. Again, where the decision-making power of the membership is 
subordinated to the strategies of third parties, the principles of the cooperative may be at risk, and likewise 
member rights.  
As a response, SMCs can resort to consortia to foster mutual-help. The consortium can be conceived as an 
instrument to achieve a critical mass of cooperative values and define the identity of cooperative 
organisations, normally through a shared code of practice. They are typically backed by network statutes, 
aims and values declarations, as well as by common assets which can be used to pursue objectives common 
to the participating organizations. Through consortia, cooperatives aim at accessing and creating business 
opportunities, innovation and knowledge transfer, capacity building and scale economies. Common assets at 
the same time support cooperative start-ups and buffer financial needs. The governance of consortia is not 
strictly regulated by law, but is intended to be horizontal and prevalently democratic, since decision making 
power needs to be shared among all involved organizations. 
Consortia of this sort are not-for-profit collective organisations, grounded on peer-support and peer-control, 
entrusting behaviours and practices that characterise social capital and that privilege inclusion, 
communication, mutuality and trust. Control rights in consortia indicate how common reserves are managed 
by cooperating organisations, and provide guidance on the incentives operating across the network. 
Relationships typically involve a plurality of inter-actors with diverse and evolving interests and do not allow 
for direct control over production choices of firms in the consortium.  
 
4.1.1. The case of the CGM and its evolution 
A notable example of this kind of network is, in Italy, CGM (Consorzio Gino Mattarelli), formed by one 
national consortia, 78 local consortia, 1,000 associate social cooperatives, about 7,000 operational units 
throughout Italy (in 70 Provinces out of 107 and in all of 20 Italian Regions), and about 45,000 workers 
(including both worker-members in cooperatives and employees).
v
 In 2012 CGM turnover was higher than 
1.1 billion Euro. CGM is a second level consortia founded in 1987 (Borzaga and Ianes, 2006; Ianes and Tortia, 
2009). Within its national network many cooperatives are characterized by cross financial participation, 
whereby financial members part take the patrimony of the organization and are granted the right to elect 
their representatives in the Board of Directors, though they can never reach a controlling position.  
In 2005 CGM was constituted as a Cooperative Group.
vi
 With this new structure CGM becomes the core 
organization directing the whole network. The Group flanks the original national consortium, which keeps its 
coordination role at an operational, executive level.  
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This governance evolution can be interpreted in terms of hybridization of the basic mutualistic structure 
(Spear, 2012). The new governance structure was in fact accompanied by the creation of 70 transversal 
organizations, which may, but need not, be cooperatives. These organizations are in charge of producing 
specialized services for the associated grass-root cooperatives. They support entry into new sectors, 
especially capital intensive ones, with high entry barriers (and potentially higher rents) such as healthcare, 
which has not been addressed by social cooperation to date. By supporting entry in markets with high entry 
barriers, the new organizations in CGM are functional also to the achievement of scale and competence 
pools against market failure, which address the specific inefficiencies originated by 
monopolistic/monopsonistic positions of service suppliers and buyers, such as the public sector or other 
conventional private firms. These strategies may be absent or ineffective when the cooperative acts in 
isolation. Peer networking and monitoring through consortia has, therefore, the potential to distance 
cooperatives from practices and incentive systems that are functional to conventional for-profit 
organisations whilst, at the same time, protecting them from subordination to monopoly power.  
Overall, CGM emerged as formalized horizontal and multi-layered network of small grass-root organizations. 
The founding structure is still in place. On its pillars, new elements (heterarchical and hierarchical, 
operational and strategic) have been added to improve efficiency in terms of market opportunities and 
coordination.   
 
4.1.2. The case of credit cooperatives in the Trentino Alto-Adige Region 
The case of credit cooperatives (BCC, Banche di Credito Cooperative) in Trentino – Alto-Adige is a successful 
experience of heterarchical coordination by means of consortia. Trentino – Alto-Adige borders with Austria 
in North Eastern Italy and is an autonomous region since 1972. It is populated by about one million people, 
across the two Provinces of Trento and Bolzano. The latter is the capital of South Tyrol, the only German 
speaking area in Italy. Informed by the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, the first cooperative bank in 
Trentino was started by Father Lorenzo Guetti in 1892 on the model of the German Raiffeisen cooperative 
bank, shortly after the publication of the encyclical letter Rerum Novarun by Pope Leone XIII in 1991. 
Cooperatives credit banks where created by farmers through the institute of unlimited responsibility to 
overcome usury and credit rationing by large commercial banks. Following a historical trend of ever 
increasing economic and social relevance, today 40 credit cooperatives with about 400 branches are 
embedded in the Province of Trento and manage about 60 per cent of the total amount of credit in the area. 
There are 124,000 members and 3,000 employees. Credit cooperatives in Trentino, like in the rest of Italy, 
are small to medium size local banks, whose territorial reach is limited and regulated by law. They are 
configured as a tightly knit collaborative Federation. The degree of formalization and complexity of the 
network is high, similarly to the Federal Association of Co-operative Banks (Volksbanken and 
Raiffeisenbanken) in Germany. The Federation has functions of representation, fiscal and legal assistance, 
consulting, training and communication. The extensive network of local cooperatives (in several peripheral 
municipalities in Trentino the cooperative bank is the only existing bank) is now centred around a second 
level consortia, the Central Cooperative Bank (Cassa Centrale Banca), which was created in 1974 and delivers 
products and services exclusively to the federated banks. Among other notable structures, a Guarantee Fund 
(Fondo di Garanzia Istituzionale) was created by the Federation in 2008 to contrast the systemic risk coming 
from the global financial crisis. Also, the Federation created and runs a number of ‘system’ companies that 
deliver specialized services, such as asset management, information systems, insurance contracts and 
training. 
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This structure of inter-firm cooperation has allowed promoting cooperative principles in several ways. 
Specifically it has allowed overcoming monopolistic power on the credit market and usury. At the same time 
it has supported peripheral small and medium enterprises and the economies in which these are embedded. 
The ability of cooperatives to operate effectively in peripheral areas without exploiting their local monopoly 
power is noteworthy and shows the economic potential of this kind of organization. 
 
4.2. The “network contract” 
An interesting example of institutional innovation that supports network creation and governance is the 
“network contract”, instituted in Italy in 2009 to favour the creation of new, collaborative networks and to 
increase the stability of existing networks. Its introduction was part of the policy measures towards the 
economic downturn to enhance innovation and competitiveness. The network contract is intended to have 
definite scope: it is created to reach an objective common to the networked organizations and lasts (when 
not renewed) until the aim is achieved. This is one of the main aspects differentiating the network contract 
from consortia, which are instead stable open-ended coordination structures for common functions and 
services. Because of its venture nature, the network contract is recognized in public tenders as a viable form 
of aggregation of a plurality of organizations (Cf. Iamiceli, 2006). 
Each networked organization keeps its legal independence, whilst interdependencies attached to shared 
production activities are recognised by the effort of each and every firm to pursue the common interests of 
all partners (Cf. Sacchetti and Sugden 2003 on networks of mutual dependence).
vii
 Albeit the network 
contract is not incompatible with hierarchical control by a larger or contractually stronger organization, it 
leaves wide room to cooperatives to shape the agreement consistently with cooperative values and aims. 
Specifically the institution of the board and of a common capital asset can reflect mutuality and democratic 
decision-making principles amongst the partners, whilst avoiding to create concentration of control and 
decision-making power. Cafaggi, Iamiceli and Mosco (2013) analyse 333 network contracts underwritten in 
Italy before 2012.
viii
 They evidence that, albeit not required by law, most contracts provide for the presence 
of a common fund and of a common governing body in charge of the utilization of financial resources.  
 
4.3. Public-private partnerships 
Public-private partnerships are developed through dedicated policies aimed at promoting community 
welfare by means of public procurement. Take as an example the Community Benefit Clause (CBC) used in 
public procurement in the UK and specifically in Scotland. CBCs were conceived by the Scottish Government 
to foster “sustainable procurement,” “a process whereby organisations meet their needs for goods, services, 
works and utilities in a way that achieves value for money on a whole life basis in terms of generating 
benefits to society and the economy, whilst minimising damage to the environment” (Sustainable 
Procurement Task Force 2006: 10; Scottish Government 2008). The community development aim provides a 
strong incentive to contractors to conform to the principle of community care and to contract out activities 
to those organisations that best serve the procurement broader objectives. For example contracting out the 
delivery of specific services to social enterprises would represent, for the main contractor, a strategy for 
fulfilling the required social objectives, such as creating local jobs and increasing the work integration of the 
disadvantaged.  
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4.4. Social Capital Networks 
Social capital networks (SCNs) are described in Campbell and Sacchetti (2013). They can be defined as 
heterarchical coordination mechanisms, which encompass essentially the same set of values that are applied 
by participant organisations. SCNs reflect the main aims of consortia, albeit without using a formal 
organisation. They are based on informal ties and kept together by a coordinator (typically a third sector 
organisation, not necessarily a cooperative), periodic meetings, and by use of social media. This practice is 
enabled also by the small dimension of the networks. The main asset in SCNs is relational rather than 
financial, offering linkages not only amongst organisations that are close and alike (bonding social capital), 
but also with other types of businesses other than cooperative organisations (bridging social capital) and at 
higher institutional levels, e.g. to access procurement opportunities (linking social capital) (Cf. Putnam 2002; 
Szreter and Woolcock 2004).  For these reasons, social capital networks represent the humus that facilitates 
the creation of more formal relations, and are therefore to be seen as a backbone for developing types of 
heterarchical networks of the sort described in the above sections (e.g. consortia, network contracts, public-
private partnerships). 
The case of the development of Social Enterprise Networks in Scotland illustrates the development model 
followed in the creation of the networks. The founder used his understanding of social capital theory, 
centred on the value of cooperation and community welfare, to introduce a network form of peer support 
that would take social entrepreneurs out of isolation and provide them with specific voice and specialised 
support. Through these networks, thematic and geographic, social entrepreneurs have formed communities 
of practice and have started to collectively act in order to establish and reinforce the norms of behaviour 
shared by social enterprises in Scotland. One of the main aims that social entrepreneurs shared was to 
become independent and autonomous from external influences, hence to move away from grant 
dependence. The fact that participants in the network shared the same values provided a basis for furthering 
communication, sharing experiences, and identifying multiple perspectives and mutually beneficial 
opportunities. The modality of interaction chosen was that of a heterarchical network, which encompassed 
essentially the same set of preferences on aims and processes that social entrepreneurs already applied to 
their own organisations. This model could be imitated also by cooperatives with which social enterprises 
share a variety of intents.  
 
5. Hierarchical coordination via external linkages  
We can talk of hierarchical coordination when production decisions are orchestrated from one major centre, 
a hub cooperative, which plays the most prominent role in deciding how production and knowledge creation 
should be divided along the value chain. Since the distribution of income across networked firms depends on 
the way production is divided, the principles applied by the governing firm define also how benefits are 
distributed across the network (Kaplinsky, 2000; Sacchetti 2004). The hub cooperative could therefore 
promote cooperative principles through its coordinating function, designing a network system that 
redistributes incomes through the production network. Oppositely it could strategically allocate production 
across the network to increase its economic power. 
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5.1. Cooperative hub-led coordination 
In the first case, we can talk of a cooperative hub-led coordination. Through cooperative hub-led 
coordination the core organisation applies cooperative principles also to external governance, actively 
searching for mutually beneficial opportunities, for compatibility between the objectives of members and 
the interests of other stakeholders. The application of the cooperative principles to other firms would add 
consistency to the organisation also internally, although this may increase the tensions between those who 
perceive the cooperative as being essentially about the welfare of members and those who would regard 
strategic behaviour towards others outside the cooperative as subject to similar principles. When the 
cooperative coordinates its different sets of relations on the ground of cooperative values and principles 
more generally, external coordination would endorse (through appropriate mixes of financial participation, 
contractual arrangements, networking and other substantive practices) participatory governance processes 
and mutually beneficial incentive structures (Sacchetti, 2013).  
 
5.2. Exclusive hub-led coordination 
In the opposite case, we talk of exclusive hub-led coordination, when cooperative values are confined within 
the cooperative organisational borders of the core firm. Relations with subsidiaries through financial 
integration or contract-based relationships such as ventures, subcontracting arrangements or shorter-term 
market relations are, in this stylised form of coordination, functional to the objectives of the core 
cooperative or particular groups within it, even despite the welfare of suppliers, partner companies or 
subcontractors. In line with recent monopoly power critiques (Cowling & Sugden, 1998; Sacchetti & Sugden 
2003) we suggest that when the hub cooperative uses its power advantage to take strategic decisions 
despite the long-term sustainability of the ‘recipients’, consistency between mutualistic principles of 
cooperatives and the wider principles of cooperation is undermined.  
As an illustration, consider a hub cooperative acting as the ‘director’ of the supply chain, the cooperative 
may manage relations in different ways. In fact, the greater the distance from the perfectly competitive 
market benchmark, the higher the relevance of firm behaviour and, therefore, strategic choice on 
coordination mechanisms. Despite its non-for profit nature, the cooperative could, as a possibility, seek 
monopoly power or collusive agreements with other producers, or exert its market power against suppliers.
 
Where the competitive element is more incisive, strategy may focus further on permanent cost minimisation 
by stimulating arm’s length market competition among substitutable producers, typically for low knowledge 
content production types.  
In summary, we talk about exclusive hub-led coordination when the modalities of the interaction resemble 
governance by exclusive direction, where relationships are administered strategically without integrating in 
strategic choice the interest of related firms. This is a case of coordination without cooperation. 
 
5.3. The evolving nature of coordination. An illustration from the Mondragon Group 
In practice cooperatives, and those of large size in particular, coordinate with other firms through a variety 
of mechanisms, and can resort to both exclusive or cooperative hub-led coordination. To illustrate, consider 
the expansion and internationalisation of the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation, which, in 2012, 
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associated 257 organisations (110 cooperatives and 147 subsidiaries), employed over 80,000, of which 
66,418 in Spain (Mondragon Corp., 2013) and about 32 thousand are members of the cooperatives.
ix
 Despite 
its shared values, internal and international growth has not occurred without tensions. In particular, the 
expansion of retailing in Spain (the Eroski retail chain employs 45,000) and manufacturing overseas involving 
65 production plants and 14.601 employees in 2006 (Monasterio, Telleria & Etxebarria, 2009) has been 
shaped by a strategy of acquisitions and green-field investments for the creation of subsidiaries, without 
worker membership. Overseas the Mondragon group has adopted a strategy towards internationalisation 
similar, in some respects, to those of traditional transnational corporations (Errasti, Heras, Bakaikoa, & 
Elgoibar, 2003; Errasti, 2013). FDIs have reflected, in part, a strategy of cost minimisation, but also risk 
reduction in the face of diverse workers attitudes regarding employee ownership across countries, and 
different legal and juridical frameworks.
x 
Overall, the growth strategy of Mondragon has raised an issue 
around their actual values, where the pursuit of members’ welfare becomes a cost for other workers inside 
controlled or otherwise affiliated companies. The challenges to the idea of membership presented by growth 
across sectors and regions, through internationalisation, are currently unresolved, but likely to change again 
the architecture of rules at Mondragon. These challenges are mixing with the backlash of the economic 
crisis, which led the oldest and largest Mondragon industrial cooperative, Fagor, to file for bankruptcy 
protection at the end of 2013, while the retail chain store of the group, Eroski - one of the largest in Europe - 
is facing difficulties as well. The likely lay–off of many non-member workers in subsidiaries and stores 
outside Spain will require a deep reshaping of the policies towards membership and employed labour, and 
towards networking inside and outside Spain. Against changing contextual conditions, the development of 
the group’s internal and external governance requires complex operations of social reconstruction, building 
“the road while travelling” (Morrison, 1991). Because explicit on its values, cooperative development has 
shown to be strongly connected with institutional development, reinforcing the need for a constant 
appraisal and elaboration of strategies and practices that are coherent with cooperative values and identity 
(Arando, Freundlich, Gago, Jones et al. 2010; Jones & Kalmi, 2012; Morrison, 1991; Stikkers, 2011; Turnbull, 
1995). 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
We have started this contribution by considering the extent to which the nature of inter-firm coordination 
can be deemed consistent with the nature of cooperation and its principles. Our analysis has emphasised 
that heterarchical networks and cooperative hub-led networks, more than the large cooperative 
corporation, can  spread cooperative values. Following our analysis and examples, the invitation to scholars 
working on the democratic governance of production organisations is to appreciate the impacts of 
cooperatives also through their extended production governance, focusing on how cooperative principles 
features differently across inter-firm relations and on how formal institutions can be improved to reflect 
cooperation at all governance levels.  
The implications for practitioners would be in terms of developing inter-firm relations around an extended 
notion of mutuality, by acknowledging, through appropriate rules and processes, multiple perspectives and 
interests. To support this process, managers in cooperative organisations can resort to the legal frameworks 
that best reflect cooperative principles, such as consortia and the network contract. From a substantive 
point of view, they can improve means of communication and deliberation, not least to achieve an inter-
subjective understanding of practices consistent with the meaning and value of cooperation. This on-going 
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dialogue can lead to the possibility to collectively evolve intermediate governance structures and non-
exploitative contracts. We have pointed in particular at cooperative hub-led coordination and heterarchical 
networks as institutional solutions that embed peer-support and democratic governance by means of formal 
or customary rules. 
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Figure 1  
Internal Institutional Levels 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To increase members’ welfare Voluntary and open membership 
Ownership of members 
Procedural fairness 
Democratic member control. 
Participation in the finance and in the 
allocation of surplus. 
Autonomy. 
III. 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
How control is implemented 
II. 
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
Property rights: who controls and 
appropriates resources 
Self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, 
equality, equity, solidarity, justice, mutual 
help, social responsibility and caring for 
others  
I. 
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
Individual values and believes, culture 
on the organisation of economic 
activities 
IV. 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Incentive structure 
Distributive fairness 
Long term sustainability 
Creation of societal value 
Limited remuneration of capital 
Reinvestment for mutualistic and 
communitarian purposes 
Fulfilment of needs and 
desires 
LEVEL COOPERATIVE NICHE CULTURE PURPOSE 
22 
 
FIGURE 2  
External Institutional Levels 
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FIGURE 3 
The governance of cooperatives and their networks 
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i
Such understanding is inter-subjective and context dependent. We can expect therefore different 
interpretations and implementations across localities and organisations, more or less in line with the seven ICA 
principles. A more general stakeholder perspective would allow a tailored application of our framework and 
further specifications regarding the nature of coordination and value consistency. For example, within 
producer cooperatives issues of worker welfare may be disregarded by a more standard focus on member 
welfare.  
ii
 We use niche-culture rather than the more widespread term of sub-culture because the latter creates a 
hierarchy amongst values which fails to recognise equal dignity to different expressions of values. 
iii
 The points of contact between new-institutionalism and ICA’s approach are only in some respects 
straightforward. For example, ICA requires cooperatives to be economically sustainable and independent, 
finding compatibility with the neo-institutional criterion of cost minimization. However, ICA also requires 
cooperatives to be democratically run by their members, and this aspect is in contrast with the alleged 
inefficiency of democratic governance which, for neo-institutionalism, inflates decision-making costs as well as 
the risk of internal contrasts, the more so when the membership is characterized by heterogeneous 
preferences (Hansmann, 1996). Similarly, the community-care principle emphasised by the ICA seems to 
recognise the multiplicity of interests to be taken into account in decision-making processes, in contrast with 
what neo-institutionalist arguments would support.  
iv
 Given their non-profit nature, external financiers have limited incentives to invest and to organise production 
in cooperatives, both because private returns on investment on specific assets are lower than in for-profit 
firms, and because – in terms of conventional economic approaches to property rights – cooperative control 
rights increase the risks of losses and of morally hazardous behaviours. 
v
 Almost all social cooperatives work in the social service sector. At the end of 2008 13,938 active social 
cooperatives employing 317,399 workers were recorded in Italy. In 2011 the turnover of social cooperatives 
overcame 7 billion of Euro.  
vi
 This is a new contract introduced in the Italian Civil Code by the 2003 reform of Corporate Law. 
vii
 Amongst others, an interesting example of its application by cooperatives is the Conesco cooperation 
network, a permanent collaborative network amongst energy service companies that develop renewable 
energy in Southern Italy (Cf. Roelants et al., 2012). 
viii
 One year later the number of such contracts grew to 707. 
ix
 Total employment in the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation decreased to 80,321 in 2012 from 83,568 in 
2011 due to the crisis of the economy and of the sovereign debt in Spain. To date, lay-offs have exclusively hit 
short term and other non-member employees, while all worker members are reported to have reserved their 
jobs.  
x
 From the corporate website: “All our companies abroad are organised as Limited Companies. There are 
several reasons for this: most of the countries do not have the appropriate legislation of a cooperative nature 
that we have here; in many cases we incorporate these companies as a joint-venture with other partners and, 
thirdly ... the setting-up of cooperatives requires cooperative members who are used to working within a 
cooperative culture, and this is a process that takes time.” www.mondragon-corporation.com/language/en-
US/ENG/Frequently-askedquestions/Business-Strategy.aspx (accessed 23 October 2012). 
